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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 eSnowshoes, Inc. is a hypothetical small company selling snow-
shoes online. To finance its business, eSnowshoes borrowed $100,000 
from Commercial Bank and granted the bank a security interest in 
its inventory, accounts receivable, and general intangibles, including 
the www.snowshoes.com domain name that it registered with Net-
work Solutions and the eSnowshoes storefront in the virtual world 
Second Life.1 Commercial Bank properly perfected the security inter-
est by filing a financing statement. Because of unusually warm win-
ters in the northeastern United States, eSnowshoes’ biggest market, 
snowshoes started to fall out of favor, and eSnowshoes defaulted on 
the loan. Commercial Bank knows that it can use self-help reposses-
sion to obtain the inventory and self-help collection remedies to ob-
tain payment on the accounts receivable, but it wants to know how to 
enforce its interest in the Internet domain name and the Second Life 
virtual “real estate.”  
 The methods of enforcing a security interest against tangible 
goods2 and intangible payment rights3 are clear under Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and to a lesser extent under 
                                                                                                                    
 ∗  Professor, Widener University School of Law. Many thanks to my research assis-
tant, Keely Espinar, Widener University School of Law, Class of 2008, and to Widener Uni-
versity School of Law for its generous research support. I received helpful guidance at a 
very early stage of this project from the participants in a faculty workshop at the Univer-
sity of Maryland School of Law. Bill Reynolds gave many helpful comments on drafts of 
this Article. 
 1. Second Life, http://www.secondlife.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2007). 
 2. U.C.C. § 9-609(a)(1) (2005) (“after default, a secured party may take possession of 
the collateral”). 
 3. Id. § 9-607(a) (“[A]fter default, a secured party may notify an account debtor or 
other person obligated on collateral to make payment or otherwise render performance to 
or for the benefit of the secured party.”). This section must be read with § 9-406, which out-
lines the rights and obligations of persons obligated on payment rights. 
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other state laws governing creditors’ rights.4 A creditor’s ability to 
enforce a security interest against other electronic assets, however, is 
far less certain. One reason for this lack of certainty is the adherence 
of commercial law to the notion of tangibility. Classifying property 
according to its tangibility or intangibility creates false categories 
unrelated to significant legal distinctions, and these false categories 
hinder the ability of commercial law to expand to adequately accom-
modate electronic assets. In this Article, I will demonstrate that the 
category of “tangible” is irrelevant in property law and argue that 
commercial law must discard distinctions based on the physical 
manifestation of assets and focus instead on the legal qualities of 
those assets. Such a shift in focus will allow commercial law to more 
readily adapt to the proliferation of emerging electronic assets that 
do not fit into established categories of intangible rights such as in-
tellectual property and payment rights. 
 In Part II of this Article, I will illustrate the dichotomous treat-
ment of tangible and intangible rights under Article 9 of the U.C.C. I 
will focus specifically on the default provisions of Article 9, which al-
low a creditor to repossess collateral upon its debtor’s default. The fo-
cus on creditors’ remedies will illustrate the importance that the 
U.C.C. places on manual possession,5 a concept that has no relevance 
when the collateral consists of electronic assets. I choose the area of 
remedies because, while many have written on the role of possession 
in the Article 9 perfection context,6 the role of possession in the 
remedies context begs for analysis. Although the U.C.C. was drafted 
to allow courts to adapt it to changing commercial conditions, in Part 
III, I will discuss some reasons why courts may have trouble expand-
ing the creditors’ remedies in Article 9 to emerging electronic assets. 
In that Part, I will discuss several cases that illustrate the extent to 
which intangible assets confound lawyers and judges. In Part IV, I go 
back in time and discuss cases from the past two hundred years that 
have successfully grappled with the concept of possession in fact sce-
narios in which manual possession was either impossible or imprac-
ticable.  
 My goal in this Article is to illustrate that the challenges posed by 
electronic assets are not new and that by keeping traditional prop-
                                                                                                                    
 4.  See infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text. 
 5. Others have focused on this issue over the years, usually when an article of the 
Uniform Commercial Code was in the revision process. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, 
Some Realism About Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 455 (1996) (stating 
that “[c]ommercial law is in the grasp of a physical metaphor”).  
 6. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An 
Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175 (1983); Peter F. Coogan, Article 
9—An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012 (1978); Schroeder, supra note 5; 
Robert A. Zadek, The Uniform Commercial Code’s Misplaced Emphasis on Possession, 28 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 391 (1994).  
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erty law principles in mind the institutions that make commercial 
law will be better able to adapt that body of law to modern transac-
tions. Almost fifty years ago, Grant Gilmore, the coreporter for Arti-
cle 9, identified the challenges that intangible assets present to the 
law of secured transactions and suggested ways in which courts 
might conquer them.7 A half-century later, lawmaking bodies con-
tinue to struggle with these problems, which present themselves in 
both property law generally and the more specific property laws re-
lated to creditors’ rights. By comparing today’s electronic assets to 
yesterday’s novel assets, both tangible and intangible, I hope to inte-
grate electronic assets into the larger category of property and 
thereby suggest a coherent approach to creditors’ rights in electronic 
assets.  
 A coherent theory of electronic assets is necessary to the develop-
ment of the laws governing the transfer and financing of these as-
sets. The need for such a theory can be illustrated by comparing the 
development of the law of electronic contracting with the treatment 
of electronic assets in our creditors’ rights laws. Courts have been 
grappling with electronic contracting issues since 1999, when the 
court in Caspi v. Microsoft8 held that a person who clicked an “I 
agree” icon assented to online terms.9 Courts opining on the enforce-
ability of electronic contracts are guided by two statutes: the Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act10 and the Electronic Signatures in Na-
tional and Global Commerce Act,11 both of which instruct courts that 
a contract cannot be denied enforceability solely because it is in elec-
tronic form or signed electronically. While some courts may have in-
terpreted this mandate too broadly, ignoring important differences 
between paper and electronic communications,12 the statutes provide 
courts with a framework within which to analyze contract terms pre-
sented electronically. The electronic contracting statutes instruct 
courts to look beyond form and consider, regardless of the physical 
manifestation of the terms, whether contract rules such as those gov-
erning offer and acceptance are satisfied. Because there is no statute 
that tells courts that the physical manifestation of an asset should be 
ignored or given little weight by courts in deciding when rights in an 
asset have been transferred, I hope in this Article to urge the recog-
nition of a general property law framework that discards tangibility 
qua tangibility as a relevant category. 
                                                                                                                    
 7. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. 
 8. 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
 9.  Id. at 530-33. 
 10. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT §7, 7A U.L.A. 211 (2002). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 7001 (2000). 
 12. See generally Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1307 (2005). 
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II.   TANGIBILITY AND THE U.C.C. 
A.   Generally 
 Article 1 of the U.C.C. sets forth its purposes and policies. In-
cluded among these purposes and policies is the modernization of the 
law governing commercial transactions and the “continued expansion 
of commercial practices.”13 As I will illustrate in this section, the per-
vasive dichotomy in the U.C.C. between tangible and intangible 
rights stifles this expansion.  
 The drafters of the U.C.C. never intended for it to cover all areas 
of commercial law.14 For instance, real estate transactions are com-
monly considered to be commercial, but are expressly excluded from 
the scope of the U.C.C.15 Even when the U.C.C. governs a transac-
tion, it is silent on some aspects of that transaction. For example, Ar-
ticle 2 of the U.C.C. governs sales of goods, but the common law of 
contracts governs most matters regarding the formation of a contract 
for the sale of goods.16 By its terms, the U.C.C. yields to common law 
principles,17 and it does not define such terms as property18 and pos-
session.19 As a result, when novel issues arise in transactions covered 
by the U.C.C., courts should fill the statutory gaps. Courts, by focus-
ing on the intangibility of electronic assets and not on the relation-
ships between the persons claiming rights in those assets and the as-
sets themselves, are not adequately filling the gaps.  
 The U.C.C. generally is divided between the tangible and the in-
tangible. Numerous examples of this dichotomy are found by examin-
ing the scope of the U.C.C. and how it covers different types of rights 
within that scope. For instance, Article 2 governs the transfer of al-
most all tangible personal property,20 while Articles 3, 7, and 8 gov-
                                                                                                                    
 13. U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2005). 
 14. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 FLA. L. 
REV. 367, 378 (1957) (“[c]ertain obviously vital fields of commerce are out . . . .”). 
 15. U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(11) (stating that Article 9 does not apply to “the creation or 
transfer of an interest in or lien on real property”).  
 16. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3 (5th ed. 
2000).  
 17. U.C.C. § 1-103(b) & cmt. 2. 
 18. See id. § 9-408 cmt. 3 (“Neither this section nor any other provision of this Article 
determines whether a debtor has a property interest. . . . [o]ther law determines whether a 
debtor has a property interest . . . and the nature of that interest.”); In re Chris-Don, Inc., 
367 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701 (D.N.J. 2005) (holding that because a New Jersey statute “em-
phatically defines [liquor] licenses as ‘not property,’ ” § 9-408, which invalidates certain re-
strictions on the transfer of general intangibles, does not apply to a New Jersey liquor li-
cense).  
 19. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 16, at § 22-8(b) (“The drafters of the UCC . . . de-
clined the futile task of defining possession in the Code.”).  
 20. U.C.C. §§ 2-102 (2000) (“[T]his Article applies to transactions in goods . . . .”), 2-
105 (defining goods as “all things . . . which are movable at the time of identification to the 
contract of sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities 
. . . and things in action”). I refer here to the unamended version of Article 2 of the U.C.C., 
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ern the transfer of specific types of intangible property: negotiable 
instruments,21 documents of title,22 and investment securities.23 The 
types of property governed by Articles 3, 7, and 8 are rights that were 
traditionally reified in paper. At the time that the U.C.C. was first 
promulgated, the intangible rights governed by Articles 3, 7, and 8 
were commonly transferred by the manual transfer of the paper em-
bodying those rights; in modern times, the drafters of the U.C.C. 
have recognized the fact that, at least in the businesses governed by 
Articles 7 and 8, the manual transfer of paper is declining in signifi-
cance.24  
 The articles of the U.C.C. that govern specific types of intangible 
property developed to accommodate business practices in various in-
dustries. The U.C.C. does not govern the sale of intangibles gener-
ally,25 and attempts to develop a statute governing the transfer of 
software have failed dismally.26 
 In one area of commercial law, distinctions based on the physical 
manifestation of some assets once served a valuable business pur-
pose. The law of negotiable instruments illustrates how possession 
and tangibility were once necessary to facilitate commerce. The req-
uisites of negotiability were developed during the Industrial Revolu-
tion, a period in which cash was in short supply.27 The banking sys-
tem at the time could not accommodate the expansion of commercial 
activity so the merchants responded by developing their own version 
of paper currency, the bill of exchange.28 These negotiable instru-
                                                                                                                    
which, at the time of this writing, is the law in all of the states that have enacted Article 2 
of the U.C.C. 
 21. U.C.C. § 3-102 (2005). 
 22. Id. § 7-101. 
 23. Id. § 8-101. 
24.UNIF. LAW COMM’RS, SUMMARY, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE—REVISED ARTICLE 7 
(2003) [hereinafter REVISED ARTICLE 7 SUMMARY], available at 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_summaries/uniformacts-s-ucc7.asp; U.C.C. Arti-
cle 8 prefatory note. 
 25. The previous version of Article 1 of the U.C.C. contained a statute of frauds provi-
sion that applied to the sale of personal property not otherwise covered by the U.C.C. 
U.C.C. § 1-206 (2000). According to the Official Comment, that statute of frauds was appli-
cable to sales of general intangibles. Revised Article 1 does not contain such a statute of 
frauds, and it has an explicit scope provision that states that Article 1 applies to a transac-
tion “to the extent that it is governed by another article of” the U.C.C. U.C.C. § 1-102 
(2005).  
 26. The story of the failed attempt to develop a uniform law of software contracts has 
been told many times. See, e.g., Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA on the Road: What Lessons 
Have We Learned?, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 167 (2001); Maureen A. O’Rourke, An Essay 
on the Challenges of Drafting a Uniform Law of Software Contracting, 10 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 925 (2006); Nim Razook, The Promise and Politics of UCITA, 36 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 643 (2003).  
 27.  Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 446-47 (1979). 
 28.  Id. at 447. 
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ments were in fact passed from person to person in payment of 
debts.29 The formal requirements of negotiability developed not only 
to facilitate physical transfer, but also to facilitate valuation. The 
terms of the contract had to be certain so that potential buyers could 
evaluate the worth of the contract.30 These principles are codified in 
Article 3 of the U.C.C.  
 While the legal distinctions based on the tangible or intangible 
nature of payment rights survive, they have been under fire for dec-
ades. Grant Gilmore described Article 3 of the U.C.C. as a “museum 
of antiquities.”31 In the 1970s, the Permanent Editorial Board for the 
U.C.C. established a committee to explore the feasibility of a “New 
Payments Code” that would establish rules for payment rights organ-
ized on functional, rather than formal, lines.32 While this approach 
was never codified, payments scholars continue to explain the irrele-
vance of the tangible form to the function of the system, with one 
scholar urging that the law focus not on outdated concepts of nego-
tiability in payment systems, but rather on the common functions of 
all payment systems, paper and electronic.33 
 Today, tangibility plays a declining role in other areas of commer-
cial law. In the past fifteen years, several U.C.C. articles have been 
revised successfully. One theme that ties these revisions together is 
the facilitation of electronic transactions. Article 1 (General Provi-
sions), revised in 2001, aims to accommodate electronic contracts 
generally in several of its new definitions.34 Article 7 (Documents of 
Title), revised in 2003, now recognizes that rights in goods in storage 
or transit can now be transferred either by the manual transfer of a 
tangible document of title or by a transfer in control of an electronic 
document of title.35 Articles 7 and 9 of the U.C.C. now provide for  
 
 
                                                                                                                    
 29. Id. at 447-48. 
 30. See generally FRED H. MILLER & ALVIN C. HARRELL, THE LAW OF MODERN 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS ¶ 2.01(1) (2003); Gilmore, supra note 27, at 447-48. 
 31. Gilmore, supra note 27, at 461. Gilmore characterized one function of codification 
as “to preserve the past, like a fly in amber.” Id. 
 32. See generally Fred H. Miller, A Report on the New Payments Code, 29 BUS. LAW. 
1215 (1984). 
 33. See generally Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit 
Systems, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 951 (1997). 
 34. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201(a)(10) (2005) (defining “conspicuous” in a manner that 
accommodates both paper and electronic records), 1-201(a)(31) (defining “record” to mean 
“information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or 
other medium”), 1-201(a)(36) (defining “send” in a manner that accommodates both paper 
and electronic communications). 
 35. REVISED ARTICLE 7 SUMMARY, supra note 24. 
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electronic documents of title36 and electronic chattel paper,37 respec-
tively, although the U.C.C. provisions governing the transfer of those 
electronic assets appear tied to concepts of negotiability that become 
irrelevant when the rights in question are electronic.38  
 Article 8 (Investment Securities), last revised in 1994, is an ex-
ample of a U.C.C. article in which physical possession and manual 
transfer were once key. Over the years, Article 8 has evolved to rec-
ognize that the covered business, securities holding, will likely 
change form over the life of the statute.39 Article 8 of the U.C.C. re-
jects the paradigm securities transaction that relies on the physical 
transfer of a certificated security. This rejection was necessary be-
cause the securities business had ended its reliance on physical 
transfer.40  
 These U.C.C. revisions illustrate that distinctions based on the 
physical manifestation of assets, while once commercially important, 
are becoming irrelevant. As I will discuss below, that view is only 
partially reflected in the current version of Article 9. 
B.   Tangibility and Article 9 
 Article 9 of the U.C.C. was also revised recently, but its provisions 
do not adequately govern security interests in intangible rights. Al-
though Article 9 purports to cover all types of personal property 
rights, both tangible and intangible, and includes as a category of col-
lateral “general intangibles,”41 in many ways it best illustrates the 
problem of the U.C.C.’s distinction between tangible and intangible 
property rights. Although a debtor can grant a security interest un-
der Article 9 in all sorts of personal property rights, and the creditor 
can perfect an interest in tangible and intangible rights by filing a fi-
nancing statement,42 Article 9 handles enforcement of those security 
interests in intangible property on an asset-by-asset basis. This is a 
problem that I have identified in earlier articles focused on Internet 
                                                                                                                    
 36. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(a)(16) (including electronic documents of title in the definition of 
“document of title”), 7-501(b) (explaining the process for negotiating an electronic docu-
ment of title).  
 37. Id. §§ 9-102(a)(31) (defining electronic chattel paper), § 9-105 (setting forth rules 
for control of chattel paper). 
 38. Mann, supra note 33, at 962. 
 39. U.C.C. Article 8 prefatory note; see also Russell A. Hakes, U.C.C. Article 8: Will 
the Indirect Holding of Securities Survive the Light of Day?, 35 LOU. L.A. L. REV. 661, 665 
(2002).  
 40. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and 
Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled By Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 
307-30 (1990); James Steven Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 1431, 1441-47 (1996).  
 41. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (defining “general intangible” as all personal property that 
does not fit within the enumerated categories of collateral in Article 9). 
 42. Id. §§ 9-310, 9-312. 
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domain names43 and is a problem that is exacerbated by the tendency 
of those involved in lawmaking to focus on tangible property as the 
property prototype. 
 The history of Article 9 shows a gradual decrease in the impor-
tance of tangibility and manual possession. As business grew and se-
cured transactions became more sophisticated, the laws governing 
secured transactions placed a decreasing amount of weight on man-
ual possession by a secured creditor as a method of perfecting a secu-
rity interest. One hundred and fifty years before the original U.C.C. 
was promulgated, physical pledge was the only method of perfecting 
a security interest in personal property.44 Various types of nonpos-
sessory security interests, perfected by filing, developed with the in-
creased demand for credit secured by inventory and receivables. As 
Karl Llewellyn described Article 9, it was designed to “bring[ ] into 
simplified and workable form the law of all chattel security, whether 
the asset be tangible, or be a single contract or accounts receivable 
transferred at wholesale or other intangibles.”45  
 Until its most recent revision, Article 9 provided for perfection by 
both pledge and filing but retained the mandatory pledge for certain 
types of property, such as negotiable instruments.46 The physical 
transfer of paper remains crucial in the law of negotiable instru-
ments and prerevised Article 9 recognized that. The most recent it-
eration of Article 9 even further reduces the significance of posses-
sion by allowing perfection of security interests in instruments and 
chattel paper by filing, while continuing to give higher priority to 
perfection by pledge.47  
 In its default provisions, however, Article 9 starts from the base-
line idea that all collateral is tangible and that a creditor can take 
physical possession of such collateral upon its debtor’s default and 
sell the collateral to satisfy the debt owed.48 Interestingly, nothing in 
the plain language of Article 9 limits the repossession remedy to 
goods and other tangible assets. As noted above, the U.C.C. does not 
define possession. Commentators, however, including the authors of 
some of the leading casebooks and treatises in the field, contend that 
                                                                                                                    
 43. Juliet M. Moringiello, Grasping Intangibles: Domain Names and Creditors’ 
Rights, 8 J. OF INTERNET L. 3 (2004); Juliet M. Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names to En-
force Judgments: Looking Back to Look to the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 95 (2003) [herein-
after Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names]. 
 44. Coogan, supra note 6, at 1014 . 
 45. Llewellyn, supra note 14, at 379 (emphasis added).  
 46. G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 3, 34 (2001).  
 47. U.C.C. §§ 9-312(a), 9-330(b), (d) (2005). 
 48. Id. § 9-609(a).  
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the repossession remedy is limited to tangible property.49 Therefore, 
in the hypothetical transaction described in the Introduction to this 
Article, Commercial Bank knows that it can repossess the inventory 
using the self-help remedy so long as it does not breach the peace.50 It 
is unlikely that Commercial Bank would be able to repossess inven-
tory from the debtor’s warehouse without breaching the peace, but it 
can resort to replevin, one of the old common-law writs that allows a 
creditor to obtain possession of tangible personal property.51 There-
fore, whether Commercial Bank proceeds by self-help under Article 9 
or by replevin under the applicable state’s non-U.C.C. law, it knows 
how to foreclose on its tangible collateral, the inventory.  
 Commercial Bank also has a relatively easy way to collect the ac-
counts receivable granted as collateral. The U.C.C. allows a secured 
creditor, after a default on the part of its debtor, to “notify an account 
debtor or other person obligated on collateral” to pay to the secured 
creditor the money that it would otherwise have paid to the debtor.52 
The definition of “account debtor” includes a person obligated on an 
account receivable,53 so Commercial Bank need only send notice to 
the parties that owe eSnowshoes money for snowshoes. After those 
persons receive the notice from Commercial Bank, they can discharge 
their obligations to eSnowshoes only by paying Commercial Bank.54 
Article 9 protects these account debtors by giving them the right to 
ask the secured creditor, in this case Commercial Bank, for proof 
that the accounts have been assigned to the creditor.55 After Com-
mercial Bank furnishes such proof, the account debtors must pay 
Commercial Bank or risk having to pay twice.56 
 Article 9 provides no foreclosure remedy to a creditor holding a se-
curity interest in intangible property that is not a payment right, or 
a “true” general intangible. Because the definition of “account debtor” 
includes not only persons obligated on accounts receivable or chattel 
                                                                                                                    
 49. LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 
43 (5th ed. 2006); LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS 135 (2006); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 16 at § 25-4 (“[The se-
cured creditor] can repossess the goods subject to the security interest . . . .”); TIMOTHY R. 
ZINNECKER, THE DEFAULT PROVISIONS OF REVISED ARTICLE 9, at 21 (1999) (discussing gen-
eral intangibles as the type of collateral for which “collection” under § 9-607 is the appro-
priate remedy). As I will explain below, § 9-607 does not adequately protect creditors with 
a security interest in general intangibles. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.  
 50. U.C.C. § 9-609. 
 51. Id. § 9-609(b)(1); 1 WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS § 6:32 (rev. ed. 2005); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 16, at § 25-8.  
 52. U.C.C. § 9-607(a)(1). 
 53. Id. § 9-102(a)(3). 
 54. Id. § 9-406.  
 55. Id. § 9-406(c).  
 56. Id § 9-406(a) (explaining that an account debtor can discharge its obligation by 
paying the assignor only until it receives notification that payment is to be made to the as-
signee). 
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paper but also any person obligated on a general intangible,57 the col-
lection remedy appears at first to extend to all types of intangible col-
lateral, not just payment rights. The U.C.C. protects only the account 
debtor obligated on an account, chattel paper, or a payment intangi-
ble, however, because only those account debtors may discharge their 
obligations by rendering performance to the secured party.58  
 As a result, Commercial Bank will not find any remedies against 
the Internet domain name and the Second Life assets in the U.C.C. 
Assuming that the rights to the domain name and virtual “real es-
tate” are considered the debtor’s property, an assumption that I will 
address in the next Part of this Article, eSnowshoes will be able to 
grant a security interest in them. Under Article 9, one of the requi-
sites for creation of a security interest is that the debtor must have 
“rights in the collateral.”59 Collateral is defined in property terms, as 
“the property subject to a security interest.”60 Both the domain name 
and the Second Life assets would be included in the definition of 
“general intangibles,”61 one of the collateral categories under Article 
9. A secured party must perfect its security interest in general intan-
gibles by filing a financing statement.62 As explained above, however, 
Article 9 does not explicitly provide for any remedy against intangi-
ble rights that are not payment rights.  
 The absence of a foreclosure remedy under Article 9 does not nec-
essarily deprive Commercial Bank of a remedy. Under Article 9, a se-
cured party may enforce its interest by “any available judicial proce-
dure.”63 These judicial procedures also developed along lines based on 
the tangibility or intangibility of the assets involved, and they vary 
greatly from state to state. Replevin, as noted above, allows a secured 
creditor to gain possession only of tangible personal property.64 Arti-
cle 9 also allows a secured creditor to resort to the judicial remedies 
available to unsecured creditors, such as execution and garnishment, 
but these remedies likewise may not allow the secured creditor to 
gain control over intangible rights that are not payment rights.65 
Creditors in every state can force the seizure and sale of a debtor’s 
                                                                                                                    
 57. Id. § 9-102(a)(3). 
 58. Id. § 9-406. Article 9 also allows creditors to collect deposit accounts, which can 
also be characterized as payment rights. Id. § 9-607.  
 59. Id. § 9-203(b)(2). 
 60. Id. § 9-102(a)(12). 
 61. Id. § 9-102(a)(42). 
 62. Id. § 9-310(a).  
 63. Id, § 9-601(a)(1).  
 64. 1 BROWN, supra note 51, § 6.32, at 6-82 (“[T]he property must be tangible and spe-
cifically identifiable.”). 
 65. Id. § 6.52, at 6-139 (“It has been said that intangible personal property is not sub-
ject to execution; however, it seems that intangible property is not subject to execution be-
cause it most often is a debt due the judgment debtor, in which case, garnishment must be 
used.” (footnote omitted)); Moringiello, supra note 43, at 131-32.  
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tangible property through the execution process, but there is no uni-
versally available mechanism by which to gain control over intangi-
ble property.  
 Generally, garnishment—the process by which the creditor brings 
an action to force a third party holding an asset of the debtor to turn 
that asset over to the creditor—is available to a creditor seeking to 
enforce rights in property of its debtor that is held by a third party.66 
Some garnishment statutes appear to enable the creditor to reach 
any property, tangible or intangible;67 others, however, narrowly de-
fine the categories of garnishable property.68 
 Many have criticized the morass of state laws governing collection 
of judgments. These judicial remedies are based on ancient writs,69 
and while some states have modernized their creditors’ rights laws to 
simplify the process of obtaining assets to satisfy a judgment, the 
process of enforcing a security interest against intangible assets is 
far from uniform. Fifty years ago, Stefan Riesenfeld described the 
field as possessing “hopeless prolixity and diversification” and placed 
the blame for such deficiencies on “the unhappy tendency of Ameri-
can jurisdictions . . . to cling with amazing tenacity to outmoded pre-
conceptions and traditions of the common law.”70 Riesenfeld was not 
alone. Others have described in detail the inadequacies of the laws 
governing enforcement of judgments.71 It is not the goal of this Arti-
cle to repeat those criticisms, but it is useful to compare two statutes 
in effect today, those of Illinois and Massachusetts, to illustrate some 
of the difficulties facing a secured creditor searching for a remedy 
against a general intangible. In Illinois, a creditor is entitled to insti-
tute a garnishment proceeding against anyone who is either indebted 
to or holds “other property” of its debtor.72 In Massachusetts, how-
ever, a creditor can bring a garnishment action only against one who 
holds “goods, effects, or credits” of the debtor.73 In 1946, a court in-
terpreting the Massachusetts statute held that the use of the words 
                                                                                                                    
 66. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS 61-62 (5th. ed. 2006).  
 67. See, e.g., PA. R. CIV. P. § 3101 (Supp. 2006) (allowing a garnishment action against 
anyone who has “custody, possession or control” of the debtor’s property). 
 68. See, e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-511 (2001) (allowing only a “liability” to be gar-
nished).  
 69. See generally Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American 
Law—A Historical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IOWA L. REV. 155 (1957).  
 70. Id. at 155. 
 71. Lorin Brennan, Financing Intellectual Property Under Federal Law: A National 
Imperative, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 195, 247-72 (2001); Doreen J. Gridley, The 
Immunity of Intangible Assets from a Writ of Execution: Must We Forgive Our Debtors?, 28 
IND. L. J. 755 (1995); Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names, supra note 43, at 129-37; Wil-
liam J. Woodward, New Judgment Liens on Personal Property: Does “Efficient” Mean “Bet-
ter?”, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1990).  
 72. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-701 (2005).  
 73. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 246, § 20 (2004). 
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“goods” and “effects” require “actual possession” by the third party.74 
While it is possible that a court today would interpret a statute such 
as this to cover intangible assets, in the next section of this Article, I 
will demonstrate that today’s courts cling to notions of tangibility 
that may never have been relevant.  
 Some states have attempted to alleviate some of the confusion by 
adopting turnover statutes that specifically allow creditors to gain 
control of intangible assets to satisfy their claims. For instance, in 
California, a creditor may obtain a turnover order under which the 
court can order all interests in the debtor’s property, either under the 
debtor’s control or under the control of a third person, to be applied 
toward the satisfaction of a money judgment.75 Rhode Island’s turn-
over statute authorizes a judgment creditor to reach “any equitable 
estate, any equitable assets, or any choses in action” of a debtor,76 
and courts recognize that this statute facilitates the seizure of intan-
gibles. In Howe v. Richardson, the First Circuit, applying the Rhode 
Island turnover statute, discussed the history of the turnover statute, 
explaining that while the Rhode Island statutes governing creditors’ 
remedies are “a tangle of provisions cobbled together over time . . . 
there is no general statutory bar to the seizure of intangibles.”77 
Texas law also provides a clear method by which a judgment creditor 
can reach assets not covered by the traditional writs; the Texas stat-
ute gives a judgment creditor the aid of the court to reach property of 
the judgment debtor that “cannot readily be attached or levied on by 
ordinary legal process . . . and . . . is not exempt from attachment, 
execution, or seizure for the satisfaction of liabilities.”78 
 The distinctions that Article 9 draws based on the physical quali-
ties of assets make no sense today and contradict both the original 
intent of the U.C.C.’s drafters and the stated policies of the U.C.C. 
Several scholars have explained that the transfer of physical posses-
sion is an anachronism that is irrelevant in today’s economy. This 
charge has been leveled at the law of payment systems79 and the law 
                                                                                                                    
 74. Jordan v. Lavin, 66 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Mass. 1946). 
 75. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 708.205 (West 1987). In California, courts recognize that 
all property of a debtor, both tangible and intangible, is subject to enforcement of a money 
judgment. See Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31939, at 
*10 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[A]ll property . . . is subject to enforcement of a money judgment, in-
cluding intangible property such as patents and copyrights.”); Imperial Bank v. Pim Elec., 
Inc., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 432, 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“[C]ommentators have remarked upon 
the breadth of property reached by such order as one of its attributes.”). 
 76. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-28-1 (2001). 
 77. Howe v. Richardson, 193 F.3d 60, 62 (1st Cir. 1999).  
 78. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002 (Vernon Supp. 2006). 
 79. Mann, supra note 33, at 953 (1997) (describing negotiability as “an outmoded and 
decaying relic”). 
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of investment securities.80 Some authors have also criticized the fact 
that Article 9 allows a creditor to perfect its interest by possession, 
noting that possession does not necessarily give notice to the relevant 
players of the creditor’s security interest.81  
 The continued adherence to the concept of tangibility in Article 9’s 
remedies provisions is counter to the intent of the original U.C.C. 
drafters, as well as to the purposes and policies of the code. The ab-
sence of clear remedies for creditors with security interests in elec-
tronic assets renders the U.C.C. nonuniform, as the secured creditor 
must look to other state laws, which are far from uniform, for its 
remedies. As a result, the remedies provisions deviate from the 
U.C.C.’s purposes of simplifying, modernizing and clarifying the law 
governing commercial transactions and making “uniform the law 
among the various jurisdictions.”82 Before the U.C.C. was enacted in 
any state, the Code’s Chief Reporter, Karl Llewellyn, justified the 
U.C.C. by describing commercial law in the 1950s as “extremely scat-
tered” and “costly in time to the lawyer and therefore costly in money 
to the business man.”83 As illustrated in this Section, the same might 
be said in describing a secured creditor’s ability to enforce its interest 
in intangible assets.84 Likewise, Grant Gilmore, another father of the 
U.C.C., explained that one of the tasks of Article 9’s drafters was “to 
simplify the legal framework so that businessmen and bankers could 
go on doing what they were already doing to everyone’s satisfac-
tion.”85 Forty years ago, Gilmore recognized some of the problems in-
herent in dealing with intangible assets and noted that while the 
drafters could have made specific provisions for all of the known in-
tangible assets at the time, they chose not to in the interest of draft-
ing a code that would solve the problems of that time and the prob-
lems of the future.86  
 The approach of the U.C.C.’s drafters—to allow courts to interpret 
the code language in light of changes in business practice—remains 
relevant today, even as new electronic assets are created. This ap-
proach is echoed by many cyberspace law scholars who have criti-
cized the way in which Congress and state legislatures have re-
                                                                                                                    
 80. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of 
Secured Lending on Wall Street, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 291, 303 (describing Amended 
Article 8 as a disaster in part because it “implicitly presumes that the paradigm of prop-
erty interests in personalty is the actual sensuous grasp of a physical object in one’s 
hand”). 
 81. Zadek, supra note 6, at 399.  
 82. U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2005). 
 83. Karl N. Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 779 (1953). 
 84. But neither I nor any other modern writer would limit the pool of aggrieved par-
ties to “business men.” 
 85. Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does Not Do for the Future, 26 LA. L. REV. 300, 
300 (1966). 
 86. Id. at 300-01. 
132  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:119 
 
sponded to some of the challenges presented by the Internet. Part of 
the criticism is that the common law is better able than legislation to 
adapt to changing conditions.87 In an early cyberspace article, Profes-
sor Lawrence Lessig suggested that the common law process was the 
best way “to let the experience catch up with the technology . . . give 
the ordinary language a chance to evolve, and . . . encourage new 
languages where the old gives out.”88 This approach has a long his-
tory in commercial law, as the original drafters of the U.C.C. wanted 
not to emulate civil law jurisdictions by drafting a code designed to 
be an exclusive statement of law, but to draft a code clear enough to 
facilitate known transactions and flexible enough to allow judicial 
decisions to fill the statutory gaps.89 In the cyberspace era, however, 
courts are doing a poor job of adapting the commercial law of prop-
erty to changing conditions, as I explain below. While it would have 
been imprudent for the U.C.C. drafting committees of the past fifteen 
years to enumerate electronic assets with specificity, the courts left 
with the task of fashioning rules governing both rightful and wrong-
ful transfers of electronic property are doing a poor job of providing 
guidance to courts deciding commercial disputes.  
III.   THE LANGUAGE OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
A.   Giving the Property Label to Intangible Assets 
Even for a lawyer, the “what is property?” problem presents no dif-
ficulty when you are dealing with goods, chattels, things: if you can 
see it, count, weigh and measure it, it exists; if you can’t, it doesn’t. 
But intangible claims are another matter entirely.90 
 Grant Gilmore wrote these words more than forty years ago, in 
explaining that while Article 9 allows anything that is property to 
serve as collateral, it does not define “property.” He recognized that 
perhaps the question “what is property?” was the wrong question and 
wondered whether we should instead ask “what types of claims or 
choses in action . . . can be presently transferred . . . with the result 
that today’s assignee will have priority over interests that attach to 
the fund after it has indisputably come into existence?”91  For the 
purpose of creditors’ rights laws, this inquiry remains current; if a 
right can be transferred for value (or in exchange for a “fund”), then 
it should be capable of serving as collateral.  Gilmore’s writings show 
a good deal of concern about the classification of intangibles in Arti-
                                                                                                                    
 87. Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in Cyber-
space, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 317 (2002). 
 88. Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744 (1995). 
 89. 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, at vii-ix (1965). 
 90. Gilmore, supra note 85, at 301. 
 91. Id. 
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cle 9, and in several of his works he criticizes as overly complex the 
separation of “pure” intangibles into contract rights, accounts, and 
general intangibles.92 It remains necessary to give those rights a 
property label because Article 9 defines collateral in property terms.93 
As a result, it is almost impossible today to discuss intangible assets 
such as domain names and items created in virtual worlds without 
first confronting the question of whether such rights constitute 
“property.”  
 Despite the fact that the way persons communicate and do busi-
ness has changed dramatically in the past fifteen years, we still lack 
an adequate vocabulary with which to describe intangible assets. 
With changes in business inevitably come changes in property rights 
and the business changes that developed with the growth of the 
Internet have similarly created a demand for new property rights.94 
Before the advent of the World Wide Web, the term “Internet domain 
name” did not exist. Today, such names sell for millions of dollars.95 
Likewise, in the burgeoning virtual worlds such as Second Life, par-
ticipants buy and sell thousands of dollars worth of virtual cash and 
other items every day.96 Although there are markets for these assets, 
their intangibility causes people to question whether these assets are 
“property” at all.97  
                                                                                                                    
 92. 1 GILMORE, supra note 89, § 12.5, at 380-83; Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does 
for the Past, 26 LA. L. REV. 285, 295 (1966); Grant Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism and 
Article 9, 47 NEB. L. REV. 659, 674 (1968). The category of “contract rights” no longer exists 
in Article 9.  
 93. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
 94. See generally DEBORA L. SPAR, RULING THE WAVES: CYCLES OF DISCOVERY, CHAOS, 
AND WEALTH FROM THE COMPASS TO THE INTERNET (2001). 
 95. For instance, the Wall Street Journal reported that the domain name “sex.com” 
sold for about $12 million in early 2006 and that “diamond.com” sold for $7.5 million. 
Kevin J. Delaney, Web Domain in Really Hot Locale: Hell.com Takes Bids, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 26, 2006, at B2. Auction sites such as GreatDomains.com list generic domain names 
for sale. According to that site, the most valuable ones include “shrimp.com” (listed for 
$3,000,000), “hikers.com” (listed for $850,000), and “tell.com” (listed for $500,000). See 
GreatDomains, http://www.greatdomains.com/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2007). 
 96. Second Life reports its in-world economic statistics at 
http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy_stats.php. Also, a search for “Second Life” in the 
Internet Games pages on eBay gives some idea of the “real world” trade in virtual world 
money and other items. Ebay, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2007). 
 97. See, e.g., Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560-61 (E.D. Va. 1999) (questioning 
whether an Internet domain name should be considered personal property subject to 
judgment liens and concluding that “a domain name that is not a trademark arguably en-
tails only contract, not property rights”); Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 
S.E.2d 80, 87 (Va. 2000) (concluding that an Internet domain name is the product of a con-
tract for services); Complaint at 5-6, Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 
(E.D. Pa. 2007) (Case No. 06-08711), available at http://lawy-
ers.com/BraggvLinden_Complaint.pdf (alleging that the operators of some virtual worlds 
deny participants property rights in their creations, despite the active trade in virtual 
world items).  
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 Of course, the question of whether a thing is “property” is some-
what miscast. The question of property is a question about relation-
ships; therefore, it is more appropriate to ask whether the person 
who wants protection of his or her rights in a resource or asset has 
rights in that resource or asset that are superior to the rights of oth-
ers. As Gilmore noted forty years ago, however, in asking property 
questions, we commonly conflate rights in things with the things 
themselves.98 We continue to do so, despite the widely accepted defi-
nition of “property” as the “relations among people with regard to 
things.”99 The use of the word “thing” in this definition may improp-
erly imply that the term property refers to rights in tangible items. 
Joseph Singer recognizes this in his slightly amended definition of 
property as the relations among people with respect to resources.100 
 Today, the rules governing the relationships among people with 
respect to electronic assets are developing. This development is a 
natural consequence of the technological changes wrought by the 
Internet. As Debora Spar illustrates in her book, Ruling the Waves: 
Cycles of Discovery, Chaos, and Wealth from the Compass to the 
Internet, the innovators who initially eschew any interference from 
the state eventually return to the state for the protection of their new 
property rights.101  
 Many commentators writing in intellectual property and cyber-
space law have also observed that we discuss property as though the 
term refers to a thing rather than a relationship. For instance, 
Stephen Carter, writing about intellectual property, stressed that 
“property” is just a legal conclusion, notwithstanding our “conversa-
tional habit . . . to talk about an owner of a resource as though the 
term [has] a legal significance.”102 Michael Madison, in advocating for 
an “all-purpose theory of things,”103 concludes that abandoning our 
conversational habit, or our “thing-based descriptions” in favor of de-
scriptions based on rules and rights, leaves us “without a vocabulary 
adequate to capture actual human experience.”104 Dan Hunter ex-
plains that observations from cognitive science investigations sup-
port the contention that we think of cyberspace as a place,105 and that 
                                                                                                                    
 98. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
 99. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 2 (2d ed. 2005).  
 100. Id. Singer notes that because “things” include the intangible, it is preferable to de-
fine property as the relations among people with respect to valuable resources. Id. 
 101. SPAR, supra note 94, at 21. 
 102. Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715, 716 (1993).  
 103. Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts and Digital Things, 56 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 382 (2005). 
 104. Id. at 478.  
 105. Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 439, 443 (2003). 
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this process of “mapping the physical onto the virtual” pervades aca-
demic discussions and lawmaking processes.106  
 This Article is not about whether electronic assets such as Inter-
net domain names and electronic creations in virtual worlds should 
be protected as property and it is not about how these new rights 
should be distributed. A number of authors have already addressed 
those questions.107 As I will illustrate in this Part, however, our lack 
of an adequate language with which to describe intangible assets can 
cause courts, in what should be routine commercial law matters, to 
delve into the question of whether an intangible asset is property or 
something else. Routine problems should not be rethought con-
stantly; otherwise, the efficiency that comes with their being routine 
is lost. 
 In Part II of this Article, I explained that eSnowshoes can grant a 
security interest in its Internet domain name and its Second Life as-
sets if those rights are considered property of eSnowshoes. The ques-
tion of whether rights in an asset are property rights is not often 
asked when the asset is tangible. When intangible assets are at is-
sue, however, people have difficulty extricating the intangible asset 
from the contract that conveyed the property right in that asset. Par-
ticipants in virtual worlds who develop their spaces in those worlds 
stand to forfeit their work if they do not comply with the terms of 
service governing those worlds. For example, while the Second Life 
Terms of Service108 and representations on the Second Life web site109 
indicate that participants in Second Life have property rights in 
their virtual world assets, the Terms of Service also provide that the 
participant’s account can be terminated and its assets forfeited if the 
participant violates the Terms of Service.110 As a result, a court would 
                                                                                                                    
 106. Id. at 474. 
 107. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2170 
(2004) (arguing that “property-rule protection for network resources is more appropriate 
than scholars have thus far recognized”); Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 715, 720 (2003) (arguing that “[b]y rewarding domain names to those techno-
logically adept and wealthy enough to grab available domain names on a first-come, first-
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A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (2005) (arguing that “computer 
code that is designed to act like real world property [should] be regulated and protected 
like real world property”).  
 108. Second Life Terms of Service § 3.2 grants members copyright and other intellec-
tual property rights to content that they create. See Second Life, Terms of Service, 
http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2007). 
 109. According to the Second Life web site, “[o]wning land allows you to control land. 
You can prevent others from visiting or building there, change the shape of the land, sub-
divide and sell it, and much more.” See Second Life, Land: How To, 
http://secondlife.com/community/land-howto.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2007). 
 110. The Terms of Service deny members any rights to data stored on the Second Life 
servers, including data created by the member. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 
108, at § 3.3. In addition, the Terms of Service allow Linden Labs, the operator of Second 
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likely question the ability of eSnowshoes to grant a security interest 
in its Second Life assets.111 
 On the other hand, real property law gives a seller of land several 
methods by which to control the use of the land that she sells. For in-
stance, a seller might restrict the use and enjoyment of the land by 
inserting a covenant into the deed.112 The remedy for breach of such a 
covenant is money damages.113 Alternatively, a seller can restrict the 
use of the land by conveying a defeasible fee, such as a fee simple de-
terminable or a fee simple subject to condition subsequent. The buyer 
of such a fee stands to forfeit the land if he uses it in certain ways.114 
Regardless of how the seller chooses to restrict the use of the land, it 
is unlikely that anyone would argue that the buyer did not receive a 
property interest in the land.115 The contract of sale116 and deed117 for 
real property, however, convey not the things, the land and the build-
ing, but an estate in those things. The estate is itself an intangible 
right, the property right. 
 The comparison between land in the tangible world and assets in 
a virtual world illustrates the problems that people tend to have giv-
ing property attributes to assets that they consider abstract. The de-
velopment of the Internet and the World Wide Web has animated the 
discussion of intangible property rights, but intangible assets are not 
creations of the Internet era. Most of us would consider our bank ac-
counts to be our property notwithstanding the intangibility of the 
bank account. Most of the known intangible assets before the advent 
of the Internet fell into two categories, intellectual property rights 
and payment rights. Both of these types of rights can be seen or oth-
erwise sensed. An idea is not entitled to copyright protection until it 
is fixed in a medium that can be perceived.118 Therefore, while the 
idea of copyright is somewhat ephemeral, everyone understands the 
nature of a literary or musical work. Likewise, payment rights are 
intangible rights, but until recently, they tended to be evidenced by 
                                                                                                                    
Life, to suspend or terminate a members’ account at any time, without any monetary liabil-
ity to the member. Id. at § 2.6.  
 111. See infra notes 124-49 and accompanying text.  
 112. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.13 (3d ed. 
2000). 
 113. Id. at § 8.21. 
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 118. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
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paper items such as checks, dollar bills, and promissory notes. Be-
cause all of these intangible rights are associated with things, giving 
the property label to them is not difficult. 
 As the thing in which rights are embodied declines in intrinsic 
value, the distinction between the tangible thing and the intangible 
right embodied in the tangible thing becomes less meaningful. Money 
serves as an interesting illustration of the false distinction between 
the tangible and the intangible. There is no inherent value of the 
pieces of paper that represent money. Therefore, money has no value 
at all unless people believe in money. Not only is American currency 
no longer backed by gold, but today, an enormous number of pay-
ment transactions do not even involve the transfer of paper money.119 
Credit and debit cards represent value, but are not themselves 
money. Today, therefore, money is truly invisible, and we confer real 
value on the idea of money.120 The evolution of money from stone 
coins to gold-backed paper to paper not backed by gold to electronic 
impulses previewed in some ways the evolution of personal property. 
Whereas wealth had traditionally been represented by real estate 
and other tangible items, it is increasingly represented by intangible 
rights.121 In Secrets of the Temple, William Greider provides the fol-
lowing description of today’s money: 
When money is no longer represented even by paper, it becomes a 
pure abstraction, numbers filed somewhere in the memory of a dis-
tant computer. In the computer, it cannot be seen by anyone, nei-
ther its owner nor the bank clerk who does the accounting. At this 
point, money has been reduced to nothing more tangible than elec-
tronic impulses, recorded on tape, which can be read or altered 
only by other electronic impulses.122 
 Despite the fact that individuals commonly think of intangible 
rights embodied in almost worthless tangible things as property, in-
tangible rights unconnected to tangible things continue to confound 
judges.123 Some judges seem to consider tangibility to be an essential 
component of property in deciding cases involving rights to electronic 
assets. By failing to look beyond the fact that the assets in question 
                                                                                                                    
 119. See RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS: 
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 3 (3d ed. 2006) (“[A]s of 2003, cash was used in only 41 
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RUNS THE COUNTRY 226-31 (1987). 
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2006, at 33 (reporting on a study by Baruch Lev, a finance professor at New York Univer-
sity, estimating the value of intangible assets on American companies’ balance sheets at 
about six trillion dollars).  
 122. GREIDER, supra note 120, at 230. 
 123. See infra notes 124-50 and accompanying text. 
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were intangible, the courts deciding these cases made decisions that 
have the potential to hinder the development of the property law 
components of commercial law. The cases discussed below show that 
despite the governing academic definition of property as the relation-
ship among persons with respect to resources, the fact that a right is 
not tangible sometimes throws the property label into question. 
 Two cases involving enforcement of judgments against Internet 
domain names illustrate the courts’ discomfort with purely intangi-
ble rights. In both of these cases, Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro 
International, Inc.124 and Dorer v. Arel,125 the courts ruled that an 
Internet domain name is the “product of a contract for services be-
tween the registrar and registrant.”126  
 Both courts were bound and hindered by the Virginia garnish-
ment statute. As discussed in Part II of this Article, garnishment 
statutes tend to be outdated and many of them do not give creditors 
the general ability to seize all intangible rights. In Virginia, only a 
liability owed to the debtor can be garnished.127 Rather than holding 
simply that a domain name is not the type of liability contemplated 
by the statute or that the domain name registrar does have some 
garnishable liability to the domain name registrant, both courts en-
gaged in some unfortunate reasoning that illustrates the lack of an 
adequate property vocabulary with which to describe intangible 
property rights. 
 In Dorer, the court ultimately avoided ruling on whether the do-
main name registrant had property rights in its name by finding an 
alternative method by which the plaintiff in a trademark infringe-
ment action could gain control over the infringing name. The plaintiff 
wanted to use the debt collection mechanism, but the court ques-
tioned whether a domain name could be subject to a judgment lien 
because only intangible personal property could be subject to a judg-
ment lien.128 In the opinion, the Dorer court distinguished between 
domain names that are trademarks and generic domain names,129 
which are not eligible for trademark protection.130 The court found 
clear property rights in trademarked names but questioned the prop-
erty aspects of generic names, explaining that “a domain name that 
is not a trademark arguably entails only contract, not property 
rights.”131 One curious result of this reasoning, which the court itself 
                                                                                                                    
 124. 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000). 
 125. 60 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D. Va. 1999). 
 126. Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 86 (quoting Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561). 
 127. VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-511 (2001). 
 128. Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 559. 
 129. Id. at 560-62. 
 130. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2000).  
 131. Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (emphasis added). 
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noted, is that a domain name that is a trademark has no exchange 
value apart from the goodwill of the enterprise holding the trade-
mark, while generic names often have great exchange value.132 The 
court also noted, perhaps incorrectly, that a domain name has no 
value without use by its registrant, and that a valueless domain 
name could not be subject to a judgment lien.133 
 The dispute in Umbro arose out of a cybersquatting case, in which 
a company, 3263851 Canada, registered a domain name containing 
the Umbro trademark.134 Umbro won its cybersquatting case against 
3263851 Canada, and was awarded injunctive relief and damages.135 
Umbro attempted to enforce the damages award by garnishing 38 of 
3263851 Canada’s domain names, which were generic names linked 
to pornographic web sites.136 To initiate the garnishment, Umbro 
named Network Solutions (NSI), the domain name registrar, as gar-
nishee and requested that NSI place the domain names on hold and 
deposit control of them into the court so that the names could be sold 
at auction.137 NSI answered the summons by claiming that it held no 
garnishable property belonging to the debtor.138 The Virginia Su-
preme Court agreed with NSI and held that Umbro could not garnish 
the domain name.139 The governing statute provided that only a “li-
ability” owing from a third party to a debtor could be the subject of a 
garnishment proceeding.140  
 Like the court in Dorer, the court in Umbro placed great emphasis 
on the fact that a domain name is created by a contract. The court’s 
main basis for its holding was that a domain name, whether it is 
property or not, is “the product of a contract for services,” and there-
fore not a garnishable liability.141 
 This holding is an excellent example of judicial discomfort with in-
tangible rights. First, the court explained that a domain name cannot 
exist without the supporting services of the domain name registrar.142 
Second, the court expressed its fear that if it allowed garnishment of 
a domain name, then all services could be garnished.143 
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 There are several problems with this reasoning. First, commercial 
law recognizes many contract rights as property rights. As I ex-
plained in Part II, in order for a right to serve as collateral, the 
debtor must have property rights in it.144 Three examples of contract 
rights that are included in U.C.C. property are accounts receivable,145 
deposit accounts146 and negotiable instruments.147 Earlier versions of 
the U.C.C. included “contract rights” as a distinct category of collat-
eral.148  
 Second, most intangible rights need the support services of a third 
party in order to be usable. For instance, ING Direct, an Internet 
bank, offers online bank accounts.149 Unless someone at ING main-
tains the records of these bank accounts, the holders cannot reach 
the value of them. One need not use an Internet bank to make this 
point. Even bank accounts at brick and mortar banks are intangible 
rights, usable only because a third party, the bank, keeps a record of 
their existence. The fact that a third party must be involved in most 
intangible property rights is crucial to understanding electronic as-
sets and crucial to developing a new method of classifying property 
rights in the Internet age.  
 Had the court focused on the property attributes of a domain 
name rather than its intangibility, it might have reached a different 
result. In Umbro, the Virginia Supreme Court missed the opportu-
nity to extend creditors’ remedies to intangible assets generally. In 
doing so, the court looked to the wrong analogy, the service contract. 
 Decisions like those in Dorer and Umbro are potentially harmful 
to the extension of existing commercial laws to electronic assets. One 
way in which this decision is harmful is that it is sometimes cited for 
the proposition that a domain name is “not property.”150 The “not 
property” label can in turn take such an asset out of the pool of rights 
                                                                                                                    
 144. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.  
 145.  U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2005). 
 146.  Id. § 9-102(a)(29). 
 147.  Id. § 9-102(a)(47). A negotiable instrument is recognized as a contract. MILLER & 
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 148. 1 GILMORE, supra note 89, at 150. 
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Chander, supra note 107, at 773-74 (describing Umbro as concluding “that a domain name 
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that can be used as collateral for a loan or distributed in a bank-
ruptcy case. In addition, the Umbro court’s reluctance to extend the 
law of garnishment to Internet domain names and intangible prop-
erty generally is bad precedent. The failure to extend the garnish-
ment remedy to intangible rights generally contributes to the bal-
kanization of the laws governing creditors’ rights in intangible prop-
erty, which is in turn undesirable because of the uncertainty and 
lack of uniformity that it breeds.  
B.   “Intangible” as a Misleading Category 
[T]he best way to learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors 
is to study general rules. Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; 
others deal with people kicked by horses . . . . Any effort to collect 
these strands into a course on “The Law of the Horse” is doomed to 
be shallow and to miss unifying principles.151 
 Judge Frank Easterbrook made these comments in 1996, in an ar-
ticle in which he analogized the subject of “property in cyberspace” to 
“the law of the horse.”152 The discussions regarding intangible assets 
in some scholarship as well as in case law seem to be leading to a 
“law of the horse” for intangibles. The intangible nature of assets 
such as Internet domain names seems to blind courts to general 
property principles. Courts, by placing paramount importance on the 
physical manifestation of assets, seem to forget to address other 
property characteristics of those assets, such as whether and how 
they can be transferred and whether the owner of the asset can ex-
clude others from it. This focus on intangibility leads to two prob-
lems. First, courts and scholars sometimes speak as though the vari-
ous types of intangible assets should be placed in a single category, a 
tendency that causes courts to make broad statements about the ap-
plication of legal principles to intangible assets. A second problem, 
related to the first, is that courts and some scholars tend to give new 
intangible rights the “intellectual property” label. Both of these ten-
dencies have the potential to hinder the development of commercial 
law in that they cause lawyers and courts to ignore well-tested prop-
erty analogies, thus prompting them to call for new rules to govern 
new assets. 
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1.   “Intangible Property” as a Discrete Asset Class 
 The growth of the Internet has reinvigorated property scholar-
ship. Scholars have analyzed the property classification of several 
different types of electronic assets, including Internet domain names, 
computer systems, and assets in virtual worlds. Some of these au-
thors have classified these types of property in broad terms, such as 
“cyberproperty”153 and “virtual property.”154 These classifications do 
not raise problems so long as the rules that the authors propose are 
limited to the specific types of rights on which they are focusing. For 
instance, in her article Defending Cyberproperty, Patricia Bellia pro-
poses a framework for the legal treatment of a network resource 
owner’s attempts to prohibit unwanted access to his system.155 In 
formulating this framework, she analyzes cases that she describes as 
“cyberproperty cases,” all of which concern access to information in a 
computer system. Rights in computer systems implicate special con-
siderations such as freedom of speech and information; thus, in for-
mulating those rights, one must take those competing interests into 
account.156 Narrowly defining “cyberproperty” as including only those 
rights gives appropriate guidance to lawmaking institutions.  
 On the other hand, other authors imply that “cyberproperty” is a 
distinct asset type. Greg Lastowka, in Decoding Cyberproperty,157 ex-
presses skepticism that digital code within a computer can or should 
be analogized to a form of property.158 Yet while he begins with a cri-
tique of applying property rules to network resources, his article also 
covers some of the cases dealing with Internet domain names, which, 
while comprised of computer code, are substantively different from 
information on a web site. Similarly, while Xuan-Thao Nguyen, in 
Cyberproperty and Judicial Dissonance: The Trouble with Domain 
Name Classification,159 focuses almost solely on Internet domain 
names, she notes that some of the domain name cases failed to “ade-
quately appraise the nature of cyberproperty in general,”160 as though 
                                                                                                                    
 153. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 107 (discussing property rights in computer systems); 
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“cyberproperty” were a class of property rights that share important 
characteristics.  
 This overbroad classification of electronic assets is also evident in 
case law. Some of the decisions discussing the applicability of the tort 
of conversion to electronic assets display a tendency to classify intan-
gible assets as a distinct category. While conversion cases are not 
creditors’ rights cases, some of the issues that must be resolved in 
the two categories of cases are similar. In both creditors’ rights and 
conversion cases, courts must determine who has exclusive posses-
sion or control of an asset. A series of New York cases, culminating in 
the New York Court of Appeals decision in Thyroff v. Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Co.,161 illustrates why focusing almost solely on the 
physical manifestation of an asset leads to decisions that do not give 
much guidance in fashioning rules for novel electronic assets.  
 Thyroff involved conversion. Conversion is an action that origi-
nally applied when a person dispossessed another of tangible per-
sonal property. The Restatement defines conversion as “an inten-
tional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seri-
ously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor 
may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chat-
tel.”162 This action applied only to tangible goods because only tangi-
ble goods could be lost or found.163 The tort of conversion was eventu-
ally extended to cover stock certificates, promissory notes and other 
intangible rights that are “merged in a document.”164 This merger 
doctrine recognizes that some intangible rights are embodied in pa-
per documents in such a way that transfer of the document effects 
transfer of the right.165  
 The plaintiff in Thyroff alleged conversion of electronic data 
stored on his computer. The plaintiff, Thyroff, had been an insurance 
agent for Nationwide, and when Nationwide terminated the agency 
relationship, it denied him access to Nationwide’s agency office auto-
mation system.166 By denying Thyroff access to the system, Nation-
wide denied Thyroff access to the information that he stored on the 
system, effectively seizing the data from him.167  
 The Second Circuit began its analysis in Thyroff by asking 
whether a conversion claim may apply to “electronic data.” The court 
recognized the merger exception, but then suggested that it was “un-
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clear and unresolved” whether the merger exception applied to elec-
tronic data.168 The court then surveyed New York law, citing cases 
dealing with a wide range of intangibles, including a plaintiff’s time, 
an artist’s interest in a performance, and medical records.169 If one 
views intangible property as a discrete category, as the Second Cir-
cuit did, the cases were split. If one focuses on the differences among 
the types of assets involved, however, they are consistent.  
 One of the cases relied on in the Second Circuit’s opinion, Sporn v. 
MCA Records,170 was cited for the rule that an action for conversion 
“will not normally lie over intangible property.”171 Had the Thyroff 
court focused on the facts of Sporn, especially the nature of the rights 
alleged to have been converted, it might have been able to formulate 
a rule governing conversion of various types of electronic data. 
Sporn, a New York Court of Appeals case from 1983, addressed 
whether a master phonograph recording of a song could be converted. 
The defendant in Sporn had acquired the recording without the 
plaintiff’s permission and used it to republish the song.172 The court 
held that because the tangible recording had been misappropriated, 
the cause of action was for conversion of the tangible recording, not of 
the intangible intellectual property rights embodied in the re-
cording.173 The recording at issue in Sporn was made in 1957, well 
before the age of digital music that can be easily copied without any 
change in quality. Therefore, what the defendant in Sporn had 
taken—the recording—was not important solely because it was tan-
gible, but because, as the master recording, it could be used to make 
marketable copies of the song on it. Thus, the transfer of the master 
recording was the transfer of the value of the intellectual property 
embodied in the recording, and the recording, because it was tangi-
ble, could be converted. Without specifically mentioning the merger 
doctrine, the court adopted it. The statement in Sporn on which Thy-
roff relied, that “an action for conversion will not normally lie, when 
it involves intangible property,”174 was probably a reasonable state-
ment at the time it was made for two reasons. First, in 1983, it was 
likely that the known universe of intangible rights consisted primar-
ily of payment rights, which were often embodied in a tangible me-
dium, and intellectual property. Second, the intangible right to which 
the court in Sporn was referring was the intellectual property right. 
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Today, however, it is unreasonable for courts to adopt that statement 
when there are many types of intangible assets, such as domain 
names, that are not shareable. 
 Another case cited in Thyroff is a trial court case, Shmueli v. Cor-
coran Group.175 The plaintiff in Shmueli, like the plaintiff in Thyroff, 
alleged conversion of business records maintained on her com-
puter.176 The opinion evidences an apparent desire on the part of the 
court to establish parity between electronic and paper records, in a 
way that appears similar to the approach taken in the electronic 
transactions acts discussed in the introduction to this Article. The 
bulk of the Shmueli opinion seems to merely focus on the difference 
between tangible and intangible assets and at one point, the court 
notes that a “virtual” record can become a “literal” record “by the 
mere expedient of a printing key function.”177 At the end of its con-
version discussion, however, the court states that the plaintiff pro-
tected the materials by an access code.178 Unfortunately, the opinion 
appears to miss the significance of the access code. If the person with 
the access code has dominion over the information, then someone 
who wrongly appropriates that access code has likely committed con-
version, as she has exercised dominion over the property of another. 
Password protected electronic materials, like domain names, are not 
shareable assets and therefore should be the proper subjects of a 
conversion action. 
 Finding a lack of clarity in New York law, the Second Circuit cer-
tified the conversion question in Thyroff to the New York Court of 
Appeals, which answered that electronic records can be the subject of 
a conversion action.179 To support its holding, the Court of Appeals 
stressed the value of intangible data in the modern economy, stating 
that a “document stored on a computer hard drive has the same 
value as a paper document kept in a file cabinet.”180 The court then 
questioned whether there was any reason “in law or logic” why crea-
tion of a document on a computer should be treated any differently 
from creation of a document with pen, ink and paper.181 While the 
court correctly noted that ownership of stock in a corporation can be 
transferred without the use of any paper, thus perhaps rendering su-
perfluous the merger requirement for conversion, it failed to explain 
why the data at issue in the case should be treated as analogous to 
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corporate stock. In its concluding paragraph, the court held that 
“electronic records that were stored on a computer and were indistin-
guishable from printed documents [are] subject to a claim of conver-
sion in New York.”182 
 Had the Second Circuit focused on aspects of the electronic data 
apart from the intangibility of the data, it might have been able to 
rule on the conversion question without certifying the question to the 
New York Court of Appeals. In its opinion, the Second Circuit ex-
plained that in New York there are several elements to a conversion 
claim. To satisfy the first element, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant’s assumption of ownership or the right of ownership was 
unauthorized.183 To satisfy the second element, the plaintiff must 
show that the unauthorized exercise of ownership was over the plain-
tiff’s goods.184 A plaintiff satisfies the third element by showing that 
the exercise of ownership was to the exclusion of the owner’s 
rights.185 The court found that two of these elements were met, but 
that it could not find the defendant liable for conversion if the action 
did not extend to electronic data.186 As a result, it seems that what 
the defendant did—assert ownership rights in assets that did not be-
long to it—was less important than the physical manifestation of the 
asset that it took without authorization. Because the Second Circuit 
focused on the physical nature of the asset, it looked to the New York 
Court of Appeals to clarify the law. 
 Cyberproperty is not a discrete asset class, nor is it a term that 
can be used to coherently describe a set of rights that persons have 
with respect to electronic assets comprised of computer code. Two au-
thors, David Nelmark187 and Joshua Fairfield,188 have recognized this 
and have drawn an important line: the line between intangible intel-
lectual property and other intangible property. Both Nelmark and 
Fairfield explain that not all intangible rights are alike, and both de-
fine virtual property as intangible property that is exclusionary,189 
that is, intangible property that can be possessed, or controlled, by 
one person.190 Nonexclusionary, or nonrivalrous property must be in-
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tangible, but not all intangible property is nonrivalrous. An Internet 
domain name is an example of such property. 
 New York’s case law illustrates why focusing on “tangible” as a 
category or on “electronic data” as a category is not very helpful. 
Such focus areas confuse rather than clarify the law. In the intellec-
tual property arena, intangibility has relevance primarily because 
several individuals can “use” the intangible intellectual property at 
the same time. But, as noted above, not all intangible rights are 
shareable.  
 The distinction between property that is exclusionary and prop-
erty that is not is a crucial one for judges to keep in mind, because 
the distinction will prevent them from falling into the habit, which I 
will illustrate below, of classifying all intangible rights that are not 
payment rights as “intellectual” property. This habit is a harmful one 
because it directs judges and lawmakers to look to intellectual prop-
erty law rather than property law generally for rules to govern elec-
tronic assets.  
2.   Intangible Assets as Intellectual Property  
 We see the tendency to place new intangible rights into the cate-
gory of intellectual property in case law and scholarship. In some re-
spects, this tendency is understandable. Intellectual property is in-
tangible, so if we are looking for a known category into which we can 
place new intangible rights, intellectual property appears to be the 
correct one. This is particularly true when applied to domain names, 
as domain names can incorporate trademarks. In addition, courts 
appear to create new intellectual property rights from time to time,191 
thus expanding the already unclear definition of intellectual prop-
erty.  
 The category of intellectual property is itself a misleading cate-
gory. Intellectual property is an umbrella term used to describe a 
number of ways in which the law protects ideas. The ideas them-
selves, however, are categorized according to functional lines and are 
dissimilar in many ways. For instance, copyright law protects an au-
thor’s rights in her original works; trademark law protects a person’s 
use of a word or mark to identify the goods or services that he pro-
vides. One important unifying concept in intellectual property law is 
that the public domain deserves protection.192 Ideas that are tradi-
tionally protected as intellectual property are nonrivalrous, that is, 
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many people can use them at once, and it is difficult to exclude others 
from the protected ideas. As a result, copyright law protects not only 
the creator’s right to exploit her creation, by granting the creator 
rights such as the publication and performance right, but also the 
public’s right to use that creation through doctrines such as fair use 
and first sale. Intellectual property laws also limit the “owner’s” 
rights in a temporal way. There are statutory time limits on the du-
ration of copyrights and patents, and a trademark is entitled to pro-
tection only so long as the mark is used in commerce.193 When some-
one wrongfully uses an idea protected by intellectual property laws, 
the action is one for infringement, in which a court will enjoin the 
wrongful user from using the protected idea.194 There is no mecha-
nism for returning the idea to the author, because ideas are nonex-
clusionary. 
 A number of authors have placed domain names into the category 
of intellectual property. For instance, authors who have written on 
the classification of domain names for the purposes of secured trans-
actions and bankruptcy have argued that their recommendations 
would facilitate the use of “domain names along with other intellec-
tual property as collateral.”195 In their article Taxing the New Intellec-
tual Property Right,196 Xuan-Thao Nguyen and Jeffrey Maine consis-
tently refer to the domain name as a “new form . . . of intellectual 
property right,”197 a characterization announced in the title of their 
article. Jacqueline Lipton asks in one article whether domain names 
are “a form of intellectual property or [other] quasi property.”198 
 Simply labeling a domain name as intellectual property is not 
harmful in itself; in fact, all of the above-mentioned authors focused 
on rules governing domain names and not other types of electronic 
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assets in their articles. The problem, however, is that the more 
courts and commentators reflexively give emerging intangible assets 
the intellectual property label, the less likely it is that courts will 
look beyond the category of intangible property in formulating their 
rules for new forms of electronic assets.  
 This misclassification is evident in the case law. Umbro, discussed 
above,199 dealt with a creditor’s rights in generic domain names. The 
trial court held that Umbro could garnish the domain names. In its 
decision, however, it fell into a common trap. Rather than simply 
characterizing the domain names as “property” that could be sub-
jected to garnishment, it characterized them as “intellectual prop-
erty.”200 In doing so, the court cited to a patent case and to an article 
about judgment creditors’ rights in intellectual property.201 Reason-
ing like this unnecessarily complicates a creditor’s enforcement of its 
rights in an intangible asset. As I will explain in the next Part of this 
Article, our law has long substituted constructive possession for 
manual possession when an asset cannot be easily manually pos-
sessed. Had the court characterized the domain name as property, 
lawyers relying on the decision could then find some way to take pos-
session or control of it. By characterizing it as intellectual property, 
however, the court directed lawyers to consult the far more complex 
rules regarding enforcement of judgments in intellectual property 
rights. As a result, the Virginia Supreme Court pointed out in Umbro 
that intellectual property rights generally cannot be taken by credi-
tors using procedures such as execution or seizure.202  
 As explained above, however, intellectual property rights are not 
analogous to domain names in one significant respect: no one has ex-
clusive control over a copyrighted work or trademark, while the do-
main name registrant has exclusive control over the use of its do-
main name. The domain name system was developed so that indi-
viduals could find web sites without being forced to remember the 
numeric IP addresses of a large number of computers.203 When a per-
son registers a domain name with a registrar such as Network Solu-
tions, the registrar links the name to the IP address of the regis-
trant’s computer.204 The name can be associated with only one IP ad-
dress; if it could be associated with many, the domain name system 
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would not work.205 Therefore, by gaining control of the registration, a 
person gains control over the valuable asset, the Internet domain 
name. Thus, the treatment of domain names as intellectual property 
can lead to a wrong result. 
 The court in Dorer v. Arel206 also made a logical misstep by auto-
matically assuming that in order for the domain name at issue to be 
protected as property, the domain name had to be intellectual prop-
erty. As explained above, the Dorer court distinguished domain 
names that are eligible for trademark protection from those that are 
not. The court explained that holders of names in the former category 
clearly have property rights in those names, but that domain names 
that do not qualify for trademark protection arguably consist only of 
contract, not property rights.207 By looking at intellectual property as 
the default category for intangible property, the court made a state-
ment that makes no sense from a market perspective. Generic names 
can be freely bought and sold for large amounts of money, but names 
that are trademarks cannot be sold without the goodwill of the busi-
ness to which they are associated. From the creditors’ rights perspec-
tive, marketability is perhaps the most important aspect of a prop-
erty right. The idea behind creditors’ remedies is to seize and sell an 
asset in order to satisfy a debt. Therefore, while Article 9 of the 
U.C.C. defines collateral in property terms, any right that a debtor 
can exchange for money should be considered a property right for 
commercial law purposes.  
 In formulating their rules to govern electronic assets, courts are 
looking to the wrong analogy. By analogizing electronic assets only to 
other forms of intangible assets, courts are missing basic property 
law principles that are unrelated to the physical manifestation of as-
sets. In the next Part, I will discuss another mistaken analogy, the 
perfect analogy to the tangible that some lawmaking bodies want to 
find.  
C.   If It’s Intangible, Can We Make It Look Tangible? 
Thinking about the Internet by reference to the physical world is 
fine, if for no other reason than that courts must apply a host of 
physical-world laws to the Internet. But blind application of the 
metaphor to reach a particular result obscures more than it illu-
mines.208 
 Mark Lemley, who wrote the above statement, and other scholars 
have questioned the tendency of courts to analogize cyberspace to a 
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place. Much of the criticism in these “cyberspace as place” articles 
centered on the extent to which property metaphors led to an unde-
sirable privatization of information.209 In this Part, I will discuss a re-
lated analogy, the “electronic asset as thing” analogy. While it is only 
natural to compare new rights to known rights, a perfect analogy to 
the tangible is almost nonsensical where electronic assets are con-
cerned. The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Kremen v. Cohen210 illus-
trates this problem, as do the rules in Article 9 of the U.C.C. applica-
ble to control of electronic chattel paper. The slavish adherence to the 
tangible right as the prototypical property right is not only inaccu-
rate, but also harmful to the development of rules governing elec-
tronic assets. This is so because the perfect analogies that I describe 
in this Part are too specific to be applied to new electronic assets as 
they emerge, potentially leading to wasteful litigation.  
 The electronic asset at issue in Kremen was the sex.com domain 
name, said to be the most valuable domain name up to that time.211 
The facts of Kremen are truly astonishing. In 1994, Gary Kremen 
registered sex.com to his business, Online Classifieds.212 Stephen 
Cohen, a con man who had spent time in prison for impersonating a 
bankruptcy lawyer, tricked Network Solutions into transferring 
sex.com to him. He did so by sending Network Solutions a letter that 
he claimed to have received from Online Classifieds.213 The letter 
claimed that the company had fired Kremen and that it was aban-
doning the sex.com domain name.214 The letter also purported to au-
thorize Cohen to use the name.215 On the basis of this paper letter, 
sent through Cohen because the “author,” Online Classifieds, claimed 
to have no Internet connection, Network Solutions transferred the 
name to Cohen.216 
 Kremen sued Cohen, and the court ordered Cohen to return 
sex.com to Kremen.217 The court also awarded Kremen $65 million in 
damages.218 Kremen was unable to collect anything from Cohen be-
cause Cohen had removed his assets and himself from the country.219 
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 Unable to collect from Cohen, Kremen turned to Network Solu-
tions, bringing an action for conversion of the domain name.220 The 
District Court held for Network Solutions, noting the “imprudence of 
superimposing the archaic principles governing the tort of conversion 
onto the nebulous realm of the Internet.”221 The Ninth Circuit re-
versed, relying in part on the Restatement of Torts, which, as ex-
plained above, allows an action for conversion when someone pre-
vents the exercise of intangible rights that are merged in a docu-
ment.222 
 In his Kremen opinion, Judge Kozinski wanted to treat electronic 
and tangible assets as equivalents for the purpose of a conversion ac-
tion. In holding that Network Solutions could be liable for the con-
version of the sex.com domain name, he stressed that “there is noth-
ing unfair about holding a company responsible for giving away 
someone else’s property . . . .”223 Yet in finding that a domain name 
registrant can bring an action for the conversion of a domain name, 
the court engaged in mental gymnastics that rendered its holding 
applicable to domain names only and not to other electronic assets.  
  The court recognized that the law of conversion had developed to 
provide that some types of intangible rights could be the subject of a 
conversion action and pointed to the merger doctrine.224 As explained 
above, this provision applies to rights traditionally transferred by 
negotiation, such as payment rights (promissory notes) and invest-
ment securities.225 Because the economic value of such rights was 
typically transferred by negotiation, that is, by manually transfer-
ring the paper, converting the paper in which the right was embodied 
could constitute conversion of the right itself. When applied to nego-
tiable instruments and shares of paper stock, the rule that intangible 
rights that are merged in a document can be the subject of a conver-
sion action makes sense. The court was unwilling to discard the 
merger requirement, first stating that California retains a “vestigial 
merger requirement,” but then noting that the fact that data is 
“stored in electronic form rather than on ink and paper is immate-
rial.”226  
 While the court in Kremen was sympathetic to the plight of own-
ers of valuable intangible assets, it was unwilling to extend the tort 
of conversion to all intangible rights. As a result, the Ninth Circuit 
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curiously found that an Internet domain name is merged in a docu-
ment, the domain name system (DNS).227  
 What is curious about this holding is that the DNS itself is not 
only intangible, but distributed among a number of places.228 The role 
of the DNS is to help Internet users find specific web sites and e-mail 
addresses. These web sites and e-mail addresses, in turn, must be 
associated with a unique Internet Protocol, or IP number. By regis-
tering a name with a registrar such as Network Solutions, a domain 
name registrant ensures that her chosen name is associated with her 
computer’s IP address.229 
 The main flaw in this decision is the attempt to make a perfect 
analogy to the tangible in a scenario in which tangibility plays no 
role. Tangibility is relevant to the law of negotiable instruments be-
cause the value represented by those instruments has long been con-
veyed by the transfer of physical possession of a piece of paper. In the 
world of Internet domain names, however, tangibility plays no role. 
The court appears to have missed the significance of the merger re-
quirement. The merger requirement recognizes that exclusive control 
of some intangible rights is achieved by possession of a paper certifi-
cate. Therefore, the paper document should be less important as evi-
dence of tangibility than as a vehicle for control.  The court correctly 
refused to extend the tort of conversion to all intangible rights be-
cause not every intangible right is susceptible to exclusive control. 
The reason that the court was correct has nothing to do with any ves-
tigial merger requirement. The DNS is important not because it 
looks like paper, but because it establishes a mechanism through 
which only one person can control the use of a domain name. The 
DNS itself is not even the appropriate analogy to the paper docu-
ment. To convert a domain name, one does not “seize” the DNS in 
any way. One does exactly what Stephen Cohen did—notify the reg-
istrar that a new person is the owner of the registered name. The ap-
propriate analogy would be to Network Solutions’ records, which are 
also intangible.230 
 Judge Kozinski wanted to establish parity between tangible and 
intangible assets. By focusing only on the physical manifestation of 
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the domain name, however, he lost sight of some of the other quali-
ties that render a domain name similar to assets that traditionally 
could be converted. Like tangible assets, a domain name is rivalrous. 
By causing Network Solutions to change the registration for sex.com, 
Cohen had effected transfer of the value of the name to the exclusion 
of the rightful owner, Kremen. Retaining the merger requirement, 
albeit in a diluted form, keeps the focus on tangibility and not on 
other important property qualities.  
 The court in Kremen stopped short of paving the way for a coher-
ent approach to electronic assets. The message that the court sent is 
that intangible property can be converted only if one can find some 
document, in tangible or intangible form, to which it is related. The 
court might have done a better job contributing to the law of elec-
tronic assets by concentrating on the classic components of property 
rather than the distinction between tangible and intangible property. 
 An illogical attachment to the tangible can be found in even the 
most recent revisions of commercial statutes. One of the most glaring 
examples is Article 9’s definition of “control” over electronic chattel 
paper.231 Chattel paper, which is defined as a “set of records evidenc-
ing both a payment obligation and a security interest in or lease of 
goods,”232 is another example of an intangible set of rights that was 
traditionally reified in paper. As a result, the transfer of those rights, 
the payment right and the property interest, is effectuated by the 
transfer of the paper. The laws governing chattel paper recognized 
this fact, and Article 9 of the U.C.C. recognizes the significance of the 
paper in its priority provisions. The usual rule in Article 9 is that the 
first secured creditor to file a financing statement against or perfect 
its interest in collateral has “priority in the proceeds of that collat-
eral,”233 but Article 9 provides different, nontemporal priority rules 
when the collateral consists of intangible rights traditionally reified 
in paper and thus conveyed by a transfer of paper. Tangible chattel 
paper falls into that category, so under Article 9, a creditor or pur-
chaser who takes physical possession of the paper takes priority over 
all other security interests in that paper, even if another creditor had 
filed a financing statement before the possessing creditor took pos-
session.234 This rule, which also applies to creditors who take nego-
tiable instruments as collateral,235 recognizes business realities. 
 In the 1990s, the drafters of Article 9 decided to provide for a new 
type of collateral, electronic chattel paper. Providing for this type of 
collateral in Article 9 was certainly in the spirit of facilitating the ex-
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pansion of commercial practices, a policy stated in Article 1,236 but 
there was not yet a business practice involving electronic chattel pa-
per on which to base the Article 9 rules. The drafters of both Article 9 
and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act recognized that elec-
tronic assets such as electronic chattel paper would probably come 
into existence, so they wrote provisions governing the transfer of 
these not-yet-existent assets.237  
 Analogizing electronic chattel paper to tangible chattel paper, the 
drafters granted those in control of electronic chattel paper priority 
over those creditors who merely perfect their security interests by fil-
ing a financing statement. If electronic chattel paper will be used in 
commerce the same way that tangible chattel paper is used, this ba-
sic concept is fine. “Control” first appeared in the U.C.C. with the 
1994 revision of Article 8, which governs investment securities. The 
drafters of Article 8 were forced to recognize the realities of the secu-
rities markets, in which millions of securities are transferred every 
day. To incorporate existing business practices, the drafters of Article 
8 developed a definition of control designed to be flexible enough to 
encompass different methods of holding and transferring securi-
ties.238 An Official Comment to Article 8 of the U.C.C. clarifies the 
control concept by emphasizing the purpose that control serves, ex-
plaining that “[o]btaining control means that the purchaser has 
taken whatever steps are necessary, given the manner in which se-
curities are held, to place itself in a position where it can have securi-
ties sold without further action by the owner.”239 In Article 8, “con-
trol” is an umbrella term that applies to certificated, or tangible, and 
uncertificated, or intangible, securities, replacing but encompassing 
“possession.”240 
 In Article 9, however, the drafters chose to define control of elec-
tronic chattel paper by analogizing control to manual possession, 
granting the creditor control if the creditor has control over the “sin-
gle authoritative copy” of the electronic chattel paper.241 The “single 
authoritative copy” must be unique, identifiable, and unalterable.242 
In the tangible world, the single authoritative copy is the original, 
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marked as such.243 In the intangible world, however, no such thing 
exists, because computers can make perfect copies of electronic in-
formation.244 It would be unreasonable to require that the computer 
code making up the electronic chattel paper be unique, unalterable, 
and identifiable. An American Bar Association committee charged 
with giving guidance for compliance with the electronic chattel paper 
provisions pointed out that requiring code to be unique “would be 
tantamount to requiring that the molecules making up the paper and 
ink dots must be unique, identifiable and unalterable.”245 
 The drafters of Article 9 wanted the market for electronic chattel 
paper systems to develop, and intended for their rules to facilitate 
such development.246 By narrowly defining “control” in terms of an 
analogy to the tangible that does not make sense, however, they may 
have delayed the use of electronic chattel paper in commerce. The 
term “control” without further definition might have sufficed, but 
then it would have been up to the market, and to courts, to deter-
mine when a party had control over the electronic asset. The drafters 
were in a bad position; as I have attempted to illustrate in this Part, 
courts have difficulty dealing with possessory rights in electronic as-
sets.  
 The problems illustrated in this Part arise from our tendency to 
view the electronic assets of the Internet age as truly novel assets to 
which modern rules must apply. As a result, when courts look for 
rules to govern these assets, they tend to look only to rules governing 
other intangible assets and not to those governing property gener-
ally. When courts and other lawmaking bodies decide that intangible 
assets can be treated like tangible assets, they attempt to draw a 
perfect analogy, which often does not make sense. As I will discuss in 
the next section, however, courts have been adapting the concept of 
possession to novel assets and transactions for centuries. 
IV.   THE HISTORICAL ROLES OF POSSESSION AND TANGIBILITY 
 Absent from the judicial opinions discussed in Part III of this Ar-
ticle is any analysis of traditional property principles. The law of 
creditors’ remedies is property law; in order for a creditor to have 
rights in a debtor’s asset, the debtor himself must have a property 
right in that asset. The creditor must be able to transfer it to a third 
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party in order to realize the value of that asset. In this Part, I will il-
lustrate that the application of those principles is not governed by 
the tangibility or intangibility of assets and that courts and other 
lawmaking bodies will make better decisions about emerging elec-
tronic assets if they look not to cases and other authority addressing 
rights in other intangible assets, but to the whole range of property 
cases that analyze the problem of obtaining possession or control 
over assets, tangible and intangible, that cannot easily be grabbed. 
 The concept of possession has a long history as a centerpiece of 
property law. Possession is said to establish first ownership of a 
right,247 a concept applied to rights over assets in the wild, such as 
animals248 and natural resources.249 Possession can also signal lesser 
rights in assets, such as security interests.250 The transfer of posses-
sion is a significant event, as it signifies the transfer of value. This 
concept is embodied in fraudulent transfer laws, which allow courts 
to unravel transfers of assets that are not accompanied by the trans-
fer of possession or control.251 Possession is also a critical component 
of the law of gifts, and it is often said that if an item can be manually 
transferred, it must be manually transferred so that the donor feels 
“[t]he wrench of delivery.”252 For the purpose of this Article, it is nec-
essary to identify why possession is an important component of credi-
tors’ remedies and from there decide the acts that should constitute 
possession. 
 The U.C.C. does not define “possession.” In National Safe Deposit 
Co. v. Stead, the Supreme Court noted that “both in common speech 
and in legal terminology, there is no word more ambiguous in its 
meaning than possession.”253 Because there is no definition of posses-
sion in the U.C.C., it is necessary to define the term in the context of 
the purposes that possession serves. Within Article 9, possession 
serves two main purposes. The first purpose is the notice function. 
For instance, a creditor can perfect its security interest under Article 
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9 by taking possession of collateral.254 The purpose of perfection is to 
give notice to the whole world that someone other than the debtor 
may have a property interest in the collateral.255 The effectiveness of 
possession as notice in this context has been analyzed by many.256 
 For the purpose of Article 9 remedies, possession serves a control 
function. A creditor who repossesses a tangible asset then has the 
right to sell that asset to satisfy the debt secured by that asset. In 
order for the creditor to realize the value of the asset, therefore, there 
must be some method by which the creditor can obtain the ability to 
transfer it. For certain intangible assets, as explained in Part II of 
this Article, the creditor can collect the asset by notifying the person 
obligated on the asset, or payment right, to make payment to the 
creditor. 
 This control function of possession is inextricably linked to the no-
tice function. According to Carol Rose, possession can be equated 
with some kind of statement.257 In the world of tangible assets, we 
assume that the person in manual possession can transfer the value 
of the asset.258 This common assumption supports some of the justifi-
cations for the notice function of possession. If the world knows the 
identity of the possessor and therefore the owner, transaction costs 
will be reduced and the asset in question will be more easily trans-
ferable.259 Clear notice also reduces ambiguity and thereby minimizes 
disputes.260 The notice function therefore facilitates the control func-
tion by telling the world the identity of the person with the ability to 
transfer the value of the asset in question. Viewing the purposes of 
possession enables us to determine the acts necessary to constitute 
possession under the remedies provisions of Article 9 of the U.C.C. 
and state judgment collection statutes. 
 While in Article 9 of the U.C.C. the term “possession” appears to 
be equated with manual possession,261 possession in property law has 
not historically been so confined. The casebook cases involving the 
acquisition of title by capture are replete with language that is rele-
vant in today’s disputes over electronic assets. Many first-year prop-
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erty casebooks devote a large part of their beginning coverage to the 
concept of possession.262 While the assets in question in the casebook 
coverage tend to be tangible, the concepts relating to the control of 
those assets need not be limited to physical property that can be 
picked up and moved around.  
 Two well-known cases involving the capture of wild animals, Pier-
son v. Post263 and Ghen v. Rich,264 illustrate the two functions of pos-
session that are important to creditors’ remedies. Whether the asset 
in question is tangible, however, is irrelevant to the concept of cap-
ture, a point that is clear even in these cases. The definitions of pos-
session in these opinions are noteworthy for several reasons. First, in 
neither case is an actual manual taking necessary—in fact, in either 
case such an act would have been nearly impossible. This is a point 
that has particular resonance in the world of electronic assets be-
cause it is of course impossible to manually grasp such assets. The 
impossibility of grasping such assets is not, however, necessarily re-
lated to the lack of a tangible manifestation of the asset.  
 Both the control and notice functions of possession are evident in 
Pierson. From that case, we learn that mortal wounding combined 
with continued pursuit constitutes control sufficient to allow the per-
son asserting such control to maintain an action for the deprivation 
of that control. The control function seems obvious from the opinion, 
as the court holds that acts that deprive the wild animal of its natu-
ral liberty, rendering escape impossible, are sufficient to constitute 
possession for the purpose of establishing property rights.265 This 
conception of possession recognizes that anyone who deprives a wild 
animal of its natural liberty can then appropriate the animal to his 
own use and then presumably transfer the value of that animal. As 
Carol Rose points out,266 however, the Pierson opinion also supports 
the notice function of possession by requiring an act that “manifests 
an unequivocal intention of appropriating the animal to his individ-
ual use.”267 Depriving an asset of its natural liberty does not, how-
ever, necessarily mean taking the asset in one’s hands. 
 From Ghen v. Rich,268 we learn that first possession need not even 
be by an act that deprives an asset of its liberty. In Ghen, the wild 
asset involved was a whale, and the dispute was between the person 
who killed the whale and the person who found the whale on the 
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beach and appropriated it to his own use.269 In a sense, killing did not 
deprive the whale of its natural liberty, because once the whale was 
shot with a bomb lance, it would sink to the bottom of the ocean and 
then several days later would float to the surface.270 As a result, a 
person other than the person who killed the whale could easily take 
it, which is what occurred, thus triggering the lawsuit. 
 The court in Ghen looked to the customs in the whaling industry 
in Provincetown and found that according to industry usage, the per-
son who killed the whale in the same manner as the plaintiff estab-
lished an ownership right in the whale.271 Not all industry usages 
would pass muster under the court’s reasoning, but the custom es-
tablished in Ghen required the “only act of appropriation that [was] 
possible in the nature of the case.”272 This reasoning should not be 
limited to tangible assets, however. It should apply to all assets that 
are not susceptible of manual possession. 
 When intangible rights are involved, the people involved in the 
relevant business will necessarily define the acts that constitute pos-
session. This is already the case in the domain name business; the 
person who can transfer the asset is the person whose name is in the 
registrar’s records.273 Participants in the businesses that use elec-
tronic chattel paper are also defining control of that asset.274 While 
some have criticized the practice of defining possession by custom, 
they do so primarily because custom does not give notice to the entire 
world of the claimant’s possession.275 This criticism has relevance 
when we look to first possession as a method of establishing title, but 
when we are talking about creditors’ remedies against electronic as-
sets, the title has already been established by contract. In the reme-
dies and repossession context, however, it is probably not necessary 
to give the entire world notice of a change in control of the asset. As 
is currently the case in the real estate business, where recording is 
deemed to give notice to the whole world of the ownership of real 
property, systems for recording the transfer of ownership of elec-
tronic assets will likely be developed.  
 Gift cases from the early twentieth century also illustrate that the 
corporeal manifestation of an asset does not have great importance 
in property law. In a series of law review articles published in 1926 
and 1927, Philip Mechem discussed the delivery requirement as ap-
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plied to gifts of chattels.276 Many of the points that Mechem made in 
those articles are as relevant today with respect to electronic assets 
as they were in the 1920s with respect to gifts of tangible assets. For 
instance, he notes that it is nearly impossible, and perhaps not very 
helpful, to define the term “delivery.”277 The concept of delivery, as 
applied to gifts, would seem to be inextricably related to the concept 
of possession, but as Mechem illustrated in his three articles, courts 
did not uniformly apply a delivery requirement that mandated a 
manual transfer of physical possession (“manual tradition” in his 
parlance). In proposing a coherent approach to delivery and posses-
sion, he identified manual tradition as the preferred method of deliv-
ery sufficient to complete a gift and then defined adequate delivery 
short of manual tradition in terms of the functions that manual tra-
dition serves.278  
 Courts have been called upon to opine on the validity of gifts in 
the absence of manual delivery for hundreds of years. These cases do 
not necessarily turn on the tangible or intangible nature of the right 
given; rather, they turn on the means of control or on indicia of own-
ership. In the 1920s Mechem recognized that a gift of a thing is not a 
transfer of the thing, but that the gift is a transfer of rights in the 
thing.279 This view is in accordance with the commonly understood 
definition of property as the relationships among persons with re-
spect to things or resources.280 At the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, questions regarding delivery of gifts arose in several contexts 
including gifts of choses in action and gifts of chattels that could not 
be easily manually possessed. 
 The analysis in the first category of cases recognized the fact that 
some intangible rights were reified in paper such that delivery of the 
paper constituted delivery of the right.281 Courts then began to recog-
nize that choses in action that were not reified could also be trans-
ferred as gifts, but there was disagreement on the method of transfer 
of those types of rights. In some cases, the courts held that delivery 
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of such an intangible right could only be effected by a written in-
strument;282 in others, the courts dispensed with the writing re-
quirement, finding a valid delivery when there were sufficient facts 
to show not only the intention of the donor to make the gift but also 
the acceptance by the donee.283 In the latter group of cases, courts 
were careful to recognize the evidentiary nature of the delivery re-
quirement and stressed that when the intentions of the parties are 
clear, such intentions should not be thwarted by an arbitrary physi-
cal delivery requirement.284 
 Another group of cases discussed by Mechem dealt with gifts of 
livestock. Here, Mechem illustrated the courts’ reliance on business 
practices in fashioning their delivery requirements. As a result, in a 
case involving a gift of cattle to minor children, Coke & Reardon v. 
Ikard,285 the court found sufficient delivery where donor branded the 
cattle with separate marks and recorded those marks, as required by 
statute, in the names of the donee children.286 In analyzing Coke & 
Reardon, Mechem made several points that have been echoed by 
modern commentators. The first is that where cattle and other live-
stock are involved, the concept of possession is somewhat illusory. In 
his description of the spectrum of possession, he explains that when 
a calf is being branded, it is probably in the possession of the person 
wielding the branding iron, but once it is out on the range, it is in the 
“possession” as the term is commonly understood, of no one.287 
 Another point that is worth noting about livestock cases is that in 
some of them, a governing statute provided that title to livestock 
transferred with sale of the mark, while in others,288 the courts sim-
ply noted that branding, being a method of permanent identification, 
was practically the only way to evidence title.289 Accordingly, courts 
and legislatures rendered the livestock fungible by recognizing that 
ownership is a right and that the right of ownership can be trans-
ferred in any way practicable. As I will discuss below, the ability of 
the American legal system to render assets fungible is recognized as 
one of our system’s great triumphs.290 
 Just as today, courts deciding cases dealing with the nature of 
electronic assets attempt to analogize them to tangible assets, yes-
terday’s courts tried to fashion concepts of delivery and possession to 
fit cases in which those concepts were inapplicable. Other courts and 
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the commentators of the day noted the absurdity of trying to fit busi-
ness practices that did not rely on physical possession into narrowly 
defined categories of physical possession.291 Mechem described the 
courts’ penchant for describing all sorts of acts as delivery as “an ex-
ample of the judicial inclination to force anything and everything 
into some existing pigeon hole.”292 
 In the creditors’ remedies context, possession is important to the 
creditor’s ability to transfer the asset in question and thus realize the 
value of it. Under the U.C.C. and other state creditors’ rights laws, 
tangibility plays an important role in the transfer. Under traditional 
property law, however, it is the law’s ability to transform the con-
crete into the abstract that facilitates transfer of assets. For instance, 
property law does not speak of land as land, but rather of estates in 
land. An estate in land, such as a leasehold, is an intangible right. 
Courts have historically standardized estates so that these estates 
could be more easily sold.293  
 Viewed in this light, our legal treatment of electronic assets is 
paradoxical. While legal scholars and economists have long separated 
the concept of property from individual items of property, today’s le-
gal institutions tend to focus on the physical attributes of individual 
items of property in developing rules to govern creditors’ rights in 
electronic assets. As a result, our ability to transform a tangible asset 
into an intangible right seems to have disappeared when the under-
lying asset is intangible.  
 One particularly good explanation of the importance of separating 
the concepts of possession and control from that of tangibility is 
found in Hernando de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital.294 In this book, 
de Soto argues that capitalism is successful in the West but unsuc-
cessful in developing countries because Western countries have a vi-
able system of “[p]roperty representation [that] enable[s] people to 
think about assets not only through physical acquaintance but also 
through the description of their latent economic and social quali-
ties.”295 As an example of how countries such as the United States ef-
fectively represent the economic concept of property, de Soto uses the 
land title system. 
 De Soto’s use of the land title system in the United States as the 
paradigm representational system illustrates how our system has ef-
fectively converted tangible items into intangible concepts to facili-
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tate the transfer of the economic value of those items. He notes that 
when a house is transferred, nothing physically changes hands.296 
 The contention that our system has transformed tangible items 
into intangible concepts is only partially correct, however. Even in 
the area of real estate transfer, American law retains a vestigial pa-
per delivery requirement. When a house is transferred, people think 
of the deed as being transferred. Indeed, the deed must be delivered 
from the seller to the buyer in order for the transfer of title to take ef-
fect.297  
 De Soto also claims that successful Western property systems 
prosper by making property “fungible.”298 We render items of prop-
erty fungible by our representational system that places items (by 
items I mean real and personal property) into standard categories. 
These standard categories allow buyers and financiers to assess the 
economic value of the assets in question.299 The foregoing is an accu-
rate depiction of our current property scheme only to a point. To con-
tinue with the commercial law example, Article 9 of the U.C.C. 
adopts a representational system to publicize security interests in all 
types of assets, tangible and intangible.300 This representational sys-
tem is the filing system. We generally do not have a representational 
system for ownership of tangible personal property, because owner-
ship of that type of property is commonly transferred by manual de-
livery. 
 The cases and commentary discussed in this Part show that gen-
erally, we have no problem viewing property as an abstraction when 
tangible assets are involved. Strangely, when the asset itself is 
somewhat abstract, we have difficulty viewing the rights in the asset 
in the same abstract way. The cases discussed in Part III show this 
tendency and the commentary discussed in Part III gives some of the 
likely reasons for our inability to view intangible assets as assets to 
which traditional property rules should apply,301 but as I have tried 
to illustrate, the idea of tangibility as tangibility has no relevance to 
property law. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Adapting laws made in an earlier time, when communications 
were face-to-face and letters were written on paper and signed in ink, 
to today’s transactions, which are increasingly electronic, can be a 
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great challenge. In commercial law, such adaptation is necessary, be-
cause it would be senseless to revise the Uniform Commercial Code 
every time a novel form of asset is developed. After all, the U.C.C. 
was originally drafted in a flexible manner so that it could encom-
pass modern transactions with some judicial interpretation. 
 In order for courts to adapt commercial law to transactions in 
electronic assets, they should keep in mind general property princi-
ples. Courts have been refashioning concepts of possession for hun-
dreds of years, and it is a small conceptual jump from determining 
control over a wild fox to finding control over a domain name. The 
failure to keep these general principles in mind will inevitably lead 
to Judge Easterbrook’s “Law of the Horse,”302 a law that is not only 
shallow, but one that is unable to adapt to new forms of assets as 
they develop. 
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